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Much contemporary ontological inquiry takes place within the
so-called ‘Quinean tradition’ but, given that some aspects of
Quine’s project have been widely abandoned even by those who
consider themselves Quineans, it is unclear what this amounts
to. Fortunately recent work in metaontology has produced two
relevant results here: a clearer characterisation of the meta-
ontology uniting the aforementioned Quineans, most notably
undertaken by Peter van Inwagen, and a raft of criticisms of that
metaontology. In this paper I critique van Inwagen’s Quinean
metaontology, finding that certain challenges, supplemented
by pressure to reflect more closely Quine’s work, should drive
Quineans to adopt a stronger metaontology incorporating more
of Quine’s radical views. I conclude that while van Inwagen’s
Quineanism is problematic there are prospects for a viable, more
wholeheartedly Quinean, metaontology.
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1. The Advent of Metaontology
The key aim for this inquiry is to critique Peter van Inwagen’s
account of Quinean metaontology. To understand what this
amounts to, it is necessary that we first achieve a clear view of
what metaontology is.
The term ‘metaontology’ was coined by van Inwagen and
described—conditional on the question of ontology being ‘What
is there?’—as the question ‘What are we asking when we ask
“What is there?”?’ (1998, 233). A plethora of explicitly metaon-
tological work followed this with some, such as the dialogue
between Eli Hirsch and Theodore Sider concerning whether on-
tological questions are verbal or substantive (see Sider 2011;
Hirsch 2013; Sider 2014), roughly fitting the pattern of van In-
wagen’s question. For them the primary question has been
semantic: what does it mean to ask, or answer, an ontological
question? However, van Inwagen’s description won’t do as a def-
inition of metaontology, not least because it is a conditional with
an unestablished antecedent. Even in the aforementioned dis-
pute it is not just the question ‘What is there?’ that is addressed
but more often, for various problematic cases, ‘Are there Fs?’,
and it is debatable whether the conjunction of all such ques-
tions is equivalent to ‘What is there?’. A more radical departure
is found in the neo-Aristotelian approaches of Kit Fine (2009)
and Jonathan Schaffer (2009), both of whom reject the afore-
mentioned identification of the ontological question because of
concerns about superficiality and instead privilege questions of
ground.
One might transform van Inwagen’s description into a
definition-schema, so that if the question of ontology is ‘(Ques-
tion)’ then the question of metaontology is ‘What are we asking
when we ask “(Question)”?’, but the range of literature widely
considered metaontological is too great for this to be acceptable.
For instance, a notable change in the field in recent years has
been an increased focus on epistemology. Jessica Wilson (2011)
argues that epistemological questions are more informative than
semantical questions when critically assessing ontology. In fact
even van Inwagen’s writings on this matter outstretch his de-
scription, being primarily methodological, and a later reference
to his starting point both re-phrases the question and adds the
further component ‘What methods should be employed in the
investigation of what there is?’ (2014, 200). It is best there-
fore to leave aside any search for a definition, not least because
such projects in philosophy or its subdisciplines typically fail.
As such the best description (not definition!) of metaontology
is simply as evaluating the practice of ontology: asking, e.g.,
what methods one should use, how one could acceptably an-
swer an ontological question, and what the significance of such
an answer is.
With this in place it is easier to see the potential for W. V. Quine
to be considered important for metaontology. Quine’s work has
a clear focus on methodological issues, and has been described
by various parties as ‘the epistemology of ontology’.1 Having
noted the scope of material relevant to the inquiry we can now
examine van Inwagen’s account of Quinean metaontology to see
what, according to him, it comes to.
1Quine himself does so informally in Quine and Fara (1994), and more
seriously in Quine (1983, 500).
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2. Van Inwagen’s Quinean Metaontology
The work in which van Inwagen introduced the term ‘metaon-
tology’, thereby clarifying a domain of ontological inquiry that
had been prone to confusion by virtue of being implicit, also ar-
ticulates what he is then boldly ‘willing to call . . . an exposition
of Quine’s metaontology’ (1998, 233), though he later hedges by
describing it as ‘essentially Quine’s’ (2009, 475). Van Inwagen
takes Quine’s metaontology to be best expressed as five theses
of varying complexity:
(Non-activity) ‘Being is not an activity.’ (2009, 476)
(Being) ‘Being is the same as existence.’ (2009, 480)
(Univocity) ‘Existence is univocal.’ (2009, 482)
(Formality) Existence is captured by the existential quantifier
(2009, 492–99).2
(Criterion) The Quinean criterion of ontological commitment (2009,
500–506).3
These principles together constitute van Inwagen’s Quinean
metaontology. In the remainder of this section I explain van
Inwagen’s advocacy of the theses. Critical examination of his
position will be left until §§3–4.
2I have paraphrased here: the precise statement of (Formality) is ‘The single
sense of being or existence is adequately captured by the existential quantifier
of formal logic’ (van Inwagen 2009, 492). I have removed the part of the
thesis that follows as a corollary and italicised ‘existence’ to loosely denote
the concept expressed by, or role played by, existence-terms. I don’t think that
van Inwagen would have cause to object to either modification.
3All labelling of claims throughout this paper is my own, in aid of internal
cross-referencing.
2.1. (Non-activity)
‘Being is not an activity.’
While this is unstated in Quine’s work, van Inwagen considers
it important to stress that one cannot usefully understand be-
ing as an activity. (Non-activity)’s implicitness makes precise
analysis difficult so he clarifies it by briefly considering what its
opposite might be. We understand the idea that entities engage
in activities, and van Inwagen further supposes that we could
stratify the activities in which something engages, ordered by
generality: I might engage in playing sports and playing football in
virtue of the same behaviour, but the former is a more general
activity. If being is an activity it is naturally thought of as the
most general activity, which everything does in virtue of being
anything: for what could anything do without being something?
On some variants of this view there is more than one most gen-
eral activity, providing an easy route to pluralism about being.
For example, what artifacts do in virtue of being artifacts may
differ from what organisms do in virtue of being organisms.
Van Inwagen attributes variants of such a view to Heidegger
and Sartre, whom he sees as obvious foils for Quine.
Van Inwagen has two grounds for rejecting the above pic-
ture and endorsing (Non-activity). The first is that the doctrine
seems to miss a difference in role between being-verbs and other
verbs. (This point is somewhat re-constructed as van Inwagen
just quotes with approval Austin’s insistence (1962, 68) that ‘ex-
ists’ ‘is a verb, but it does not describe something that things do
all the time, like breathing, only quieter’.) The second is that
while van Inwagen thinks it plausible that there is a most gen-
eral activity, he considers enduring the best candidate.4 There
isn’t any particularly strong conceptual link between enduring,
4This argument may not be important to van Inwagen. He endorses it
in his (1998) but abandons it in his (2009). Nonetheless, it seems to be his
only justification that does not rely on a sweeping linguistic generalisation. I
suggest an alternative defence of (Non-activity) in §4.3.
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which everything is supposed to do, and existence. That is,
although existence is related to all properties in some sense, it
appears to bear no more of a special relationship to enduring
than to any other property.
2.2. (Being)
‘Being is the same as existence.’
Corollary: From (Non-activity) and (Being),
existence is not an activity.
This thesis is easier to engage with. Against (Being), such
thinkers as Meinong (1960/1904) and in certain moods Russell
(1912) claimed that there were reasons to include certain things
within the domain of being but exclude them from the domain
of existence. Intentional objects are a paradigm case: under the
view that to have a thought about something the thought must
have an object, thinking about, e.g., Pegasus seems problematic
without accepting some entity to be thought about. Clearly the
word ‘Pegasus’ is meaningful, yet how do we maintain a dis-
tinction between being thinkable and being real without a weaker
and a stronger sense of being? On such a view Pegasus is/has
being/subsists, but does not exist.
Van Inwagen’s central argument for (Being) is that denying it
results in misleading equivocation. For instance, if I say ‘There
is a white elephant in the next room,’ it is no defence on my part
to blame your failure to find it on its non-existence while main-
taining that it nevertheless is because otherwise you could not
have looked for it. Uttering that statement in such circumstances
would be obviously unhelpful. A related persuasive factor in
the case for (Being) is the availability of satisfying paraphrases
of apparent reference to non-existent objects. If you say that
Pegasus does not exist but subsists because it figures in ‘Pegasus
does not exist,’ I can say instead that nothing fits the predicate
‘is Pegasus’ though the predicate is meaningful in virtue of the
role of its implicit descriptive components, e.g., ‘is winged’, ‘is a
horse’, in other statements. This is just one of many strategies to
resolve the worry.
Van Inwagen’s claims might seem ultimately circular, uncon-
vincing unless we already accept (Being), but we can reconstruct
a clearer argument from his claims as follows. Some contend
that we have (primarily linguistic) reasons to distinguish state-
ments of the form ‘There are Fs’ from ‘Fs exist’, e.g., ‘There
are many things he believes in that don’t exist.’ The infelici-
tous case of the white elephant constitutes compelling counter-
evidence, leaving the opponent of (Being) in need of a clear
account. The proponent of (Being) can offer interpretations that
apparently accommodate everything significant in apparently
referring statements about non-existent objects, so the onus is on
others to demonstrate a failure to do so.
Aside from the historical conflict with Meinong, opposition
to this thesis is found in Fine (2009), who takes existence (which
he sometimes terms ‘reality’) to be a property possessed only
by those things which are fundamental parts of the world.
Broadly speaking (Being) reflects a commitment to a ‘flat’ on-
tology, where objects are simply accepted or repudiated; on this
view there is no room for levels, or degrees, of being.
2.3. (Univocity)
‘Existence is univocal.’
Corollary: From (Being) and (Univocity), being is univocal.
We can understand the key question here as whether there is
a unified sense to the concept existence. The tempting thought
going against (Univocity) is that for some predicates ‘F’ and ‘G’
one could say ‘There are Fs’ at one time and ‘There are Gs’ at
another and, while both statements would be quite in order, their
conjunction would be absurd. This obviously depends on what
properties ‘F’ and ‘G’ designate: no one would resist the move
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from ‘There are tables’ and ‘There are chairs’ to ‘There are tables
and chairs’, but ‘There are tables and numbers’ strikes us as
odd and not necessarily because of doubt about numbers. This
thought is developed by Ryle (1949), who argues that ‘exist’ is
ambiguous. To demonstrate the thought, the invalid argument
below trades misleadingly on two senses of ‘rise’:
The tide is rising.
Life expectancy is rising.
* Therefore, at least two things are rising.
According to Ryle analogous arguments with existence would
look similarly odd, e.g.:
There exists at least one number.
There exists at least one table.
?? Therefore, there exist at least two things.
In counter to this intuition van Inwagen notes that apparent
‘cross-category’ quantification is in perfect order under the right
circumstances, citing as an example:
The Prime Minister had a habit of ignoring the existence of things
he didn’t know how to deal with, such as public opinion and the
Navy. (van Inwagen 2009, 487)
If we pick plausible instances of ‘There are Fs’ (he criticises Ryle
for selecting statements like ‘There are Wednesdays’ which look
bizarre even alone) there will be some acceptable combinations,
with infelicity increasing proportionally with complexity, which
is no surprise, as sensible contexts will be harder to find.
Van Inwagen also finds an opponent of (Univocity) in Putnam
(2004), whose dissent stems from a different argument. Rather
than appeal to use, Putnam claims that one could choose to apply
‘exists’ in any one of multiple ways. In the well-known toy case
of two philosophers confronted with a universe of three simples,
Putnam holds that one could adopt a convention on which that
universe contains three objects, while the other could adopt a
convention on which that universe contains seven objects (all
mereological sums of those three simples). Debate about which
of these is right is, for Putnam, wrongheaded. Provided both
speakers can express what they need to, the two conventions are
mutually incompatible but individually acceptable.
In response van Inwagen says simply that Putnam is viewing
the situation backwards. If one decides to ‘extend’ the domain
of one’s quantifiers, that is rational only if one already believes
that there are objects not covered by one’s current quantifier-
terms. In that case, one was simply not aware of all that there
was beforehand. Putnam denies that ‘there is, somehow fixed
in advance, a single “real”, a single “literal”, sense of “exist” ’
(2004, 84), but van Inwagen retorts that the ‘fixed in advance’
sense is required to make it possible even to coherently claim
that the extension to the domain of quantification is non-empty
(2009, 491).
2.4. (Formality)
‘Existence is captured by the existential quantifier.’
Corollary 1: From (Formality) and (Non-activity), the
existential quantifier does not denote an activity.
Corollary 2: From (Formality) and (Being), being is
captured by the existential quantifier.
Corollary 3: From (Formality) and (Univocity), the
existential quantifier is univocal.
Van Inwagen defends (Formality) with a demonstration of how,
using ordinary English words and simple modifications thereof,
we could introduce formal quantification into our language,
following a similar method demonstrated by Quine (1940).
Natural-language pronouns allow us to refer back to things in-
troduced by ‘there is’ or ‘for all’ in a sentence, and once we
eliminate ambiguity using subscripts and regimentation we ef-
fectively have variables bound to quantifiers. I will rehearse this
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in shortened form.5
On one version of this method, we start from count-nouns
and observe two different (stilted) natural-language sentences:
(1) Tibbles sees a dog and Tibbles chases that dog.
(2) If Tibbles sees a dog, Tibbles chases that dog.
In (1) I use ‘a dog’ and ‘that dog’ referentially, i.e., there is some
particular dog I refer to, and in (2) I use them generally, i.e.,
there need be no particular dog I refer to. Suppose I substitute
‘it’ (I demonstrate only for the general use, but an comparable
procedure is available for the referential); I then get
(3) If Tibbles sees a dog, Tibbles chases it.
Some sentences cause problems of ambiguity, so for clarity we
introduce subscripts attaching ‘it’ to count-nouns. To consider
a variation:
(4) If Tibblesx sees a dogy , itx chases ity .
Here a simple switch of subscripts substantially alters sentence-
meaning. To render this more systematic we attach each sub-
scripted pronoun so that ‘itα’ references the closest suitable
count-term preceding it (the ‘true of’ construction aids this sys-
tematicity):
(5) It is true of Tibbles that itx is such that it is true of a dog
that ity is such that if itx sees ity then itx chases ity .
This effectively introduces variables to our language (note that
(5), (4), (3), and (2) are equivalent), and to introduce quantifiers
we need only consider general and referential sentences not re-
stricted to Tibbles. We then add the phrases ‘it is true of every-
thing that itx is such that . . . ’ and ‘it is true of at least one thing
that itx is such that . . . ’ and introduce brackets to resolve fur-
ther ambiguities. At this point, substituting quantifier-phrases
5The examples and numbering are my own, but the structure broadly
follows van Inwagen’s method (2009, 492–98).
for quantifiers and variable-pronouns for variables generates
Quine’s canonical notation apparently without any controver-
sial departure from ordinary language; thus finally (assuming a





y(y is a dog→ (x sees y →
x chases y))).
The utility of the existential quantifier for expressing existence
finds its opponents in ordinary language philosophy and again
in Fine (2009), for whom ‘∃x(Fx)’ only says that there are Fs
while the existence of Fs is expressed by ‘
A
x(Fx → Rx)’, where
‘R’ denotes is real or exists. Again speaking broadly, (Formality)
reflects a commitment to what has previously been described
as ‘ideal language’ philosophy (e.g., in Rorty 1967), where state-
ments’ significance is assessed via their role in a formal theory
rather than in natural language. Van Inwagen just lets his ac-
count of the ordinariness of quantification speak in favour of
(Formality).
2.5. (Criterion)
According to van Inwagen, this thesis cannot be stated simply.
However it will be helpful for us to reproduce Quine’s two most
compressed statements of the criterion of ontological commit-
ment:
To be is, purely and simply, to be the value of a variable. (Quine
1948, 32)
Or:
. . . a theory is committed to those and only those entities to which
the bound variables of the theory must be capable of referring in
order that the affirmations made in the theory be true. (Quine
1948, 33)
I return in §4 to the question of why van Inwagen neglects to
pick up on either as a statement of (Criterion).
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This thesis certainly plays the most central role in van Inwa-
gen’s Quineanism and whereas the others are primarily about
the explananda of ontology this is clearly methodological. He
describes it as identifying ‘the best way—the only reasonable
way—to attempt to answer [the ontological question]’ (1998,
241). It is wrong, van Inwagen says, to take (Criterion) as assum-
ing that there are well-defined things called ‘theories’ which by
being changed into quantifier-variable form can reveal hidden,
objective, ontological commitments. It is unclear how to pick
out well-defined theories, and nor can we provide unique trans-
lations into ‘canonical notation’. The first problem can be dealt
with passably by simply taking a theory to be a class of sentences,
pushing the problem back to how we choose between theories,
but the second is more significant. Translation into canonical no-
tation can deviate more or less from ordinary-language structure
depending on certain salient findings. Consider the following
statements:








x(x is a planet→
A
y( if y is a star, x is at any time at
some distance from y)).
c.
A
x(x is a planet→
A
y(y is a star→
A
t(if t is a time,
then x is at some distance from y at t))).
d.
A
x(x is a planet→
A
y(y is a star→
A
t(t is a time→
∃z(z is a distance ∧ x is at t separated from y by z)))).
Conditional on benefits and costs any of these could be consid-
ered the canonical translation of (7), depending on whether any
analysis requires accepting as an entity something problematic,
e.g., something with unclear identity conditions. Van Inwagen
thinks this holds for (7d), which reifies distances, so favours
analysing the statement using a relation. We thus see that (Cri-
terion) is a pragmatic proposal. It cannot give a well-defined
procedure but only methodological guidelines. These guide-
lines help to clarify the inquiry because for any ontological posi-
tion plausible translations into canonical notation can be sought
for typical statements: then (i) anyone who refuses the trans-
lation owes an explanation of their apparent failure to explain
the phenomena, and (ii) if an accepted translation straightfor-
wardly entails the existence of Fs there is, unless a better trans-
lation is constructed, a commitment to Fs. This clarification of
the method for disputing ontology shows why Putnam, despite
himself rejecting it, says that ‘it was Quine who single-handedly
made Ontology a respectable subject’ (2004, 78–79).
3. Too Hard, Too Easy: Rejections of Quineanism
We have now completed our brief review of van Inwagen’s Quin-
ean metaontology. However, since the explicit introduction of
the subject many, indeed most, philosophers writing in this vein
have criticised Quineanism. Of course non-adherence to the
Quinean tradition is not confined to the past decade. There have
always been opponents to Quine’s approach to metaphysics.
However, it is within the context of explicit focus on metaonto-
logy that dissent from this tradition has been articulated most
clearly. In this section I select and outline two key criticisms
that ground rejections of Quinean metaontology,6 and diagnose
the underlying problems making the arguments possible as im-
plausibility and irrelevance—accusations to which van Inwagen’s
Quineanism cannot respond.
6Many challenges to Quinean metaontology are not addressed here, both
for reasons of space and because they are not so easily accommodated into the
diagnosis. For instance, Jody Azzouni (1998; 2004) argues against (Criterion)
that there is no reason to select it over competitors, and Stephen Yablo (1998)
claims that the Quinean approach falters because it relies on a distinction
between literal and metaphorical talk that cannot be made precise. A full
defence of Quinean metaontology (whether van Inwagen’s version or my
proposal) would need to respond to these and other arguments.
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3.1. Easy Ontology
An intuition frequently cited by metaontologists is that there is
something strange about puzzling over ontological questions.
‘It seems’, some think, ‘that the issues in ontology that inter-
est philosophers the most . . . have completely trivial answers’
(Hofweber 1999). In some cases the question of Fs’ existence is
certainly difficult—take for instance F as ‘Higgs boson’—but the
characteristic problems of ontology involve questions about the
existence of things whose existence-conditions seem to some to
be obviously met. Versions of this challenge can be found in, e.g.,
Stephen Schiffer (2003) and Hirsch (2005), but as each individ-
ual proceeds somewhat differently, I will focus on the clearest:
Amie Thomasson’s ‘easy ontology’ argument, developed ini-
tially in defence of ordinary objects (2007) and later extended to
ontology in general (2014).
Consider the question whether there are non-organic com-
plex objects: the existence of things like tables, according to
this argument, should never come into question. We under-
stand what the world is like sufficiently to understand, were
there such a thing as a table, when the conditions for a table’s
existence would be met. Very roughly, for wood or a suitable
substitute to be arranged so that a flat surface is fixed to a rel-
atively small number of vertical supports would be for there to
be a table, if there were such things. But such conditions do
seem to be met, and there are no obvious special conditions.
Doesn’t that just mean that there are tables? For Thomasson it
is clear that there are ‘analytic entailments’ from states of affairs
described without explicit ontological commitments to states
of affairs described with commitments (e.g., if there are some
particles arranged tablewise, then there is a table), and this is
sufficient to demonstrate the acceptability of reference to the rel-
evant objects. Thus, Thomasson thinks, ‘a theory does not avoid
commitment to any entities by avoiding use of certain terms or
concepts’ (2007, 167), and as she sees (Criterion) as founded on
denying this, she rejects Quinean metaontology.
As Thomasson acknowledges (2014, 80), this strategy closely
resembles the neo-Fregean account of mathematics (see e.g.,
Hale and Wright 2001; 2009) as epistemological considerations
are used to suggest that it doesn’t take much to fulfil numbers’
existence-conditions. Fine employs similar reasoning to say that
‘John and Mary are “together” and that is reason enough to
suppose that they are a couple; the object over there has a certain
form and function and that is reason enough to suppose that it
is a chair’ (Fine 2009, 160).
As far as those offering this argument see it, the Quinean
approach keeps digging further when an acceptable answer
has already been reached, arguing out of existence perfectly
respectable entities by applying a method that is ill-suited to
inquiry about them: given that ordinary conditions are met,
how could metaphysical considerations encourage us to doubt
something’s existence? This argument is consistent with sev-
eral approaches to ontology quite different from Thomasson’s.
Most are deflationary, like Hirsch’s approach, on which there
is no empirical difference between theories accepting terms like
‘table’ as referring terms and those that eliminate them so the
dispute must be verbal and won easily by an ontology cribbed
from ordinary language. We will now examine a very different
criticism of Quinean metaontology—that it ignores important
questions of grounding and fundamentality—but we will revisit
the question of who can endorse arguments like Thomasson’s.
3.2. Missing Questions of Ground
Not motivated by Thomasson’s deflationary approach, another
group are instead inclined to say (as touched on in §1) that the
Quinean is preoccupied with superficial issues that are not of
genuine importance to metaphysics. On this view ‘contempo-
rary metaphysics, insofar as it has been inspired by the Quinean
task, has confused itself with trivialities’ (Schaffer 2009, 361) be-
cause the project has been focussed on what there is instead of
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what is fundamental.7 A key difference between these cases is
that while the former is conceded as involving linguistic analy-
sis, the latter can only be done by engaging in ‘first philosophy’.
Again, though there are many versions of this challenge, I will
focus on one case: Schaffer’s ‘grounding’ challenge.
The intention here is to resurrect a more ‘traditional’ view of
metaphysics on which the project is to investigate what things
ground the existence of other things, and thereby what the fun-
damental constituents of reality are. For Schaffer existence-ques-
tions are uninteresting. If we determine that tables exist and that
numbers exist, Schaffer thinks, we have not achieved much, and
it is misleading to leave things there because it suggests an un-
likely parity between these kinds. Whereas one might think that
tables’ existence is derivative of certain facts about the arrange-
ment of microphysical particles and human practices, numbers’
existence is not derivative of these and is plausibly not derivative
of anything at all. What we are interested in, he then thinks, is
not the existence of numbers, tables, etc., but their natures. If one
is seeking explanation, the right route proceeds via explaining
what numbers are grounded in. If numbers are grounded in
facts about physical arrangements of particles, then nominalism
(of a kind different from the Quinean gloss on it) is true, and
if they are not grounded in anything more fundamental, then
Platonism is true. One cannot settle questions like this using
7One might be inclined to object that there is a shift here from metaontology
to metametaphysics, because ontology just is the study of what there is. As
was hopefully clear from §1, I don’t think that attempts to define philosophical
disciplines are helpful. However, I will make two further points. First, as
Schaffer (2009, 363n20) indicates, the term ‘ontology’ has its roots in Aristotle
as the study of being qua being, a characterisation which rules out neither the
Quinean approach nor Schaffer’s alternative. Second, it seems to me clear that
the topics discussed in this debate form a set of issues that are collectively more
similar to each other than any case is similar to some areas of metaphysics,
most obviously the problem of free will. I therefore persist in using the term
‘metaontology’ to denote that area where we might reasonably expect some
unity in methodological inquiry.
the Quinean method, Schaffer says, because it does not con-
cern itself with stuctures of dependence and grounding. Where
the Quinean primarily goes wrong, according to those who in-
voke this idea, is in focussing on language. ‘With sufficient per-
versity, every branch of human inquiry can be characterized
as inquiry into what exists’ (Schaffer 2009, 365) by exploiting
quantifier-variable form. E. J. Lowe provides a similar diagno-
sis, more explicitly finding fault with the linguistic aspect of
the approach. ‘The linguistic, or semanticist, approach to ques-
tions of metaphysics inevitably leads to a doctrine of extreme
ontological relativity’ he says, adding that ‘it collapses into . . .
relativism’ (Lowe 1998, 8).8
A striking feature of this criticism is its contrasting attitude
toward Quineanism, compared to the first challenge. While by
one camp the Quinean approach is regarded as too inflationary,
by the other it is seen as concerned with trivialities, too langu-
age-relative. The examples of the challenges examined here are
more-or-less compatible: Schaffer thinks that we do in fact easily
determine the existence of all sorts of entities via Moorean argu-
ments, and takes that as evidence of the failure of Quineanism
to capture the difficult metaphysical problems he believes there
are. However, one could reject Thomasson’s position and still
make this second argument. One could, instead of being permis-
sive about ordinary existence claims, say that only fundamental
things exist and that other existence-claims are false, or true only
in a loose manner of speaking. The focus would then be squarely
on fundamentality as there would not really be derivative enti-
ties to participate in grounding-relations, but the resistance to
any ‘linguistic’ approach would remain. It is irrelevant to our
current inquiry which way of proceeding is more promising, as
they are premised on the same rejection of the Quinean method.
8This comment is particularly salient given the account I go on to propose.
It is not within the remit of this paper to comprehensively answer the charge
that ontological relativity leads to full-blown relativism.
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3.3. Diagnosis: Implausibility and Irrelevance
I don’t think that either the easy ontology argument or the
grounding argument is ultimately compelling; that is, we should
not be led to adopt the approaches that naturally develop from
them. However, I also don’t think that the Quinean as charac-
terised by van Inwagen can respond to them. Understanding
why will set us up to propose a stronger account in §4.
The central issue here is language, specifically, the conception
of how it relates to metaphysics. Ontological issues are often
explained in van Inwagen’s writings alongside a description of
utterances as having a fixed, ‘ordinary’, content that is prior
to metaphysical conclusions. When an individual utters state-
ments of a certain type, those following van Inwagen’s lead can
either claim that the content of these utterances is neutral or that
it is committing. If it is committing it might turn out that our best
account of reality proves those individuals wrong, but then they
have been guilty of misspeaking when using their language and
should strictly switch to a better language (or apply stricter rules
to their current language).9 If it is neutral, on the other hand, or-
dinary speakers have no stake in resisting ontological ‘revisions’
because they are not genuine revisions but forays into novel con-
tent. Either the community is prone to all-encompassing error,
or the metaphysical theory changes the subject. This reveals
why van Inwagen’s Quineanism is in trouble: opponents can
pursue different slants on a basic tension in how the Quinean
understands the language-ontology relationship which makes
possible two forms of accusation: implausibility, and irrelevance.
This tension, between providing an account of linguistic be-
haviour and providing an account of mind-independent, basic
issues, manifests when van Inwagen’s Quinean juxtaposes meta-
9This response is not favoured by van Inwagen when he is pressed on the
matter. However, rejecting it doesn’t seem required by his metaontology, so
for generality I consider this alternative response that is in line with, e.g.,
Merricks (2003) and Sider (2011).
physical language-use and ordinary language-use, with the for-
mer accorded definite content prior to the construction of a the-
ory. This treats ordinary speakers as occupying an undesirable
epistemic position with regard to describing the world. On the
other hand, they are part of a community with shared interests
and beliefs that must inform any theory that purports to account
for that community’s behaviour. If we think of the content of
speakers’ utterances as pre-theoretically fixed there is an imme-
diate challenge that is hard to answer: why should speakers defer to
the recommendations of ontology? That is, how can a ‘revisionary’
ontology provide a good account of what speakers are doing
that fits with their obvious communicative success?
To fail to answer this challenge is to fall victim to implausibil-
ity. Consider the following admonition to philosophers willing
to pronounce confidently on the non-existence of numbers:
If we philosophers are sorely puzzled by the classes that constitute
mathematical reality, that’s our problem. We shouldn’t expect
mathematics to go away to make our life easier. (Lewis 1991, 58)
This forms part of David Lewis’s intuitively powerful recom-
mendation that philosophers avoid schooling experts on things
about which they are experts. Suppose that people are experts
regarding their utterances (which they seem to be if those ut-
terances are assigned definite pre-theoretical content): then it
looks like sheer arrogance of the kind Lewis criticises to accuse
them of describing the world poorly.
The alternative to embracing the kind of error theory above
while maintaining van Inwagen’s Quineanism is even more
problematic. This would involve supposing that we are not in-
terested in correcting ordinary behaviour because the way that
people ordinarily speak is correct, but insisting that the meta-
physician is engaged in a separate task, of describing the world
in a special language with concerns divorced from ordinary
ones—the ‘language of ontology’ (Dorr 2005) that is now well-
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known as ‘Ontologese’.10 In recent work van Inwagen counsels
this approach, saying that ‘only metaphysicians . . . have ever
considered—ever entertained, ever grasped, ever held before
their minds—[metaphysical propositions]’ (2014, 6).
This treats ontology as of no concern to ordinary speakers but
of great concern to metaphysicians, so while linguistics might be
sufficient for understanding everything said in an ordinary con-
text, in metaphysical contexts—in the ‘ontology room’—a dif-
ferent language is spoken where there are real consequences for
what truly exists. To do this, I claim, is to invite the accusation
of irrelevance.11 Taking this route requires acceptance that in
some sense one’s activities are irrelevant to non-metaphysicians
so some alternative explanation, not relying on common inter-
ests, must be given of why Ontologese matters. Two concerns
arise here.
First, no grounds are available for such an explanation if we
look at success in achieving typical goals of language (aside from
blatantly circular goals like ‘doing fundamental metaphysics’).
Though one might consider what counts as ‘achieving the goals
of language’ as hostage to fortune, there are good reasons to
think it implausible that there could be drastic differences be-
tween Ontologese and the wider community with regard to
explanatory goals, as it is consistently treated as a constraint
on philosophical theories that however radical their departures
from pre-theoretic intuition they avoid giving counsel in di-
rect tension with ordinary behaviour. This plausible constraint
10Van Inwagen tends to favour not a language but a context: the context
of the ‘ontology room’. For my current purposes these are not importantly
different: just as one can treat Ontologese as the language everyone should be
speaking or as a language to be used only when doing metaphysics, one can
say that the standards of the ontology room are the only correct standards or
that they are just the correct standards for metaphysical discourse.
11Another way of characterising what these moves constitute is offered by
(Hofweber 2009, 267), who calls them commitments to ‘esoteric’, as opposed
to ‘egalitarian’, metaphysics.
can be seen even in the explanatory burdens historically taken
on by radical ideas—from ancient Pyrrhonism to Berkeleian
idealism—and thus has bite without needing an absolute ‘pre-
serve the phenomena’ principle. The worry about communica-
tion has echoes of the easy ontology argument, which challenges
the Quinean to show the merits of their approach by finding a
failure in ordinary language-use.
Second, it is hard to see how one should explain the merits
of using a linguistic approach to ontology while cordoning off
metaphysics from language. If ordinary language, and consider-
ations of charity (which will be relevant below), are to be ignored
when practising metaphysics, how is one to avoid making mis-
takes as a result of cross-contamination from ordinary language?
This seems impossible in practice: our notion of what constitutes
a suitable language for ontology is informed by the languages
with which we are familiar, so constraints will be in place on
Ontologese that come from natural-language considerations. I
cannot see how van Inwagen’s Quinean might justify the place
that these constraints have in theory-construction. This thought
is reminiscent of the grounding challenge, which questions how
attempts to pursue fundamental metaphysics can reasonably
proceed through language. Thus the same basic tension makes
both challenges possible.
4. Toward a New Quinean Metaontology
How do we avoid the flaws highlighted in §3? The above discus-
sion is instructive, but more work is needed. It is now incumbent
on us to do two things. First we must consider whether Quine’s
approach is fatally flawed. This cannot be resolved satisfactorily
without a great deal more work, but we can indicate whether
there are grounds to think that Quine’s work is valuable. I test
this in §4.1 by looking at what van Inwagen’s account misses.
Having found that there is scope for developing Quine’s views
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more effectively, we must then find a more satsfying way to re-
spond to the problems with van Inwagen’s Quineanism while
retaining a perceptibly Quinean framework; I attempt to start on
this project in §§4.2–4.3.
4.1. Not the Whole Story
One might take from the arguments in §3 the moral that Quin-
ean metaontology needs to be abandoned. Indeed that is the
intention of Schaffer and Thomasson, and many other contem-
porary thinkers share this opinion. However I think a more
constructive moral is in order: that van Inwagen’s account fails
to capture Quine’s insights into metaontology. This is not to say
that van Inwagen misses the mark entirely: the problems with
his approach are closely bound up with the mismatch between
the broader ‘Quinean tradition’ and Quine’s own work.12 As an
account of the metaontology that has been described as ‘the pre-
ferred methodology’ (Manley 2009, 3) for ontology over the past
few decades, I think van Inwagen’s account is fairly accurate,
though extended argument to this effect will have to be left for
elsewhere. To motivate this shortfall, I will demonstrate where
van Inwagen’s account in particular sits ill with Quine’s work.
One might worry that too much focus on exegesis will muddy
the waters here. While I think that it could do so, especially as
van Inwagen’s primary goal is to articulate the foundations of
his own approach to ontology, we should not leave this aside
altogether for two reasons. First recall that as indicated above the
five theses are advertised as at least ‘essentially’ an ‘exposition
12This notion of a contrast between the Quinean tradition and Quine has
often been suggested in passing, e.g., by Eklund (2006, 96), Jenkins (2010,
884) and Thomasson (2014, 48–50). Huw Price (2009) forcefully argues that
Quine has been misunderstood as resurrecting the kind of ontological project
that abounds in current work, but does not develop an extensive account of
what Quine is doing. More recently, Berto and Plebani (2015, pt. I) discuss
the Quinean metaontology at length, but their introductory focus leaves only
minimal room for critical consideration of this question.
of Quine’s metaontology’, so by checking their accuracy we are
assessing an explicit claim made by their patron, and second I
think it important to note that philosophical positions are not
ahistorical. Following a pattern established by an earlier figure
suggests reliance on shared assumptions and exposure to shared
problems, so an inaccurate picture of a position’s genealogy en-
courages errors in evaluating it.
With that in mind, a worrying aspect of van Inwagen’s account
is the infrequency with which it cites Quine directly. This is less
worrying where the account bears no obvious tensions with
Quine’s work. For instance, while van Inwagen acknowledges
a lack of direct evidence to justify (Non-activity) as a Quinean
thesis, one would be hard-pressed to find a location in which
Quine says anything that does not mesh with the claim and in
fact it sits well with most of what he says. In contrast to this,
there are certainly points that should be more controversial, for
instance (Univocity). While Quine does insist that we should
not countenance different complementary senses of ‘exists’, it is
less clear that Quine would object to the claim that two individ-
uals could in an appropriate sense ‘quantify over everything’
while their quantifiers ranged over different things—even over
domains of different cardinality. What, after all, would two
imagined translators of ‘Gavagai’, one finding rabbits and the
other finding rabbit-time-slices, be doing? Their interpretations
would both be quantifying in a manner that allowed them to
respond appropriately to stimuli, but the time-slice translator
would quantify over many more things in a typical utterance;
this is seen as acceptable because ‘what matters is structure’
(Quine 1983, 500).
This complication in the story of (Univocity) is symptomatic
of a deeper problem, despite it seeming initially to fit well with
other theses like (Being). In van Inwagen’s favour, for Quine an
ontology consists just of those things that (according to a theory)
there are, which seems to lend itself to a fixed understanding of
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quantification. It also seems required to capture the difference
between Putnam and Quine on ontology already discussed in
§2.3. However there is in fact a vast gap between Putnam’s and
van Inwagen’s positions on quantification, and the best interpre-
tation of Quine situates him somewhere in this gap. Neither van
Inwagen nor Putnam sees such a gulf, and the fact that Putnam
clearly disagrees with Quine then creates the false impression
that (Univocity) must be part of a Quinean approach, as though
it were merely the negation of Putnam’s position.
Van Inwagen originally named (Univocity) as part of Quin-
eanism before increased interest in quantifier variance was en-
gendered by Hirsch (2002; 2009), but it is worth considering this
issue in terms of quantifier variance, especially considering that
it is based in the work of Putnam (1987; 1994; 2004). On the doc-
trine of quantifier variance there are multiple candidate mean-
ings for existence-terms, none of which is privileged. This claim
is notoriously difficult to pin down, with many of its opponents
confessing an inability to understand what ‘quantifier variance’
means. I think that part of this problem is that one could mean
more than one thing by ‘quantifier variance’. Consider the claim
Putnam denies: that there is a single ‘fixed in advance’ sense of
‘exists’. We can deny this claim without denying that there is a
single sense of ‘exists’: if it is a desideratum in philosophy that
we provide the most general explanation possible, it will be at
best an undesirable but unavoidable result if we are incapable
of unifying our most general forms of quantification. This can
be the case without it being true that we need to hit a stan-
dard for quantification ‘set by the world’ in order to be getting
things right. This idea could also be put in a counterfactual
form: whatever unified sense allocated to ‘exists’, we could have
assigned it a different sense, that is, we could have carved up
reality differently (as misleading as ‘carving’ metaphors can be).
We can think of this in terms of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ quantifier
variance.
Strong forms of quantifier variance, on which we would be
able to truly deny claims like ‘There are numbers’ prior to an
extension of the language and truly assert them after the ex-
tension, are hard to defend because a plausible interpretation of
our shared theory would be stable regarding existence-claims so
would generate pressure to view the prior statement as false.13
In a weak form, however, quantifier variance seems to fit with
Quine’s metaontological views. A natural reading of (Criterion)
suggests that there are multiple ways that we could have used
our quantifiers. In fact thanks to the inscrutability of reference
there are multiple consistent ways to treat us as using quantifiers
as things stand. Thus whatever meaning we ultimately assign
to the quantifier it will be univocal, but until we somehow an-
chor reference (more on this in §4.2) there are many acceptable
options:
Our overall scientific theory demands of the world only that it be
so structured as to assure the sequences of stimulations that our
theory gives us to expect. (Quine 1981, 22)
This difficulty encourages wider worries. There are difficult
questions about how to reconcile what van Inwagen does say
with Quine’s work, but the most striking difficulty arises with
what is missing from van Inwagen’s account. For instance,
he indicates ‘Ontological Relativity’ as one of the locations in
which Quine’s metaontology is articulated (2009, 475n6), but
the thesis of ontological relativity has no place in van Inwagen’s
Quineanism. Furthermore, van Inwagen comments on what
Quine has to say about science as follows:
Quine assigns a special, central role to the affirmations of physical
science in his discussions of ontological commitment. I would
13Ultimately this is a matter of presentation for Quine: regarding whether
the change leading to molecular theory involves the replacement of solids by
swarms of molecules or the assertion that those solids are constituted by said
swarms, he says that the choice ‘is unreal’ (1960, 265).
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say that this was a consequence of certain of his epistemological
commitments and not of his metaontology. (van Inwagen 2009,
506n53)
Given that Quine is clear about his interest in the epistemology
of ontology, and how important epistemological questions have
turned out to be to metaontology, it seems that van Inwagen’s
excluding discussion of science from Quine’s metaontology is
either arbitrary or illicitly serves an interest in identifying meta-
ontology as his shared ground with Quine. I return to ontolog-
ical relativity and to naturalism in §4.2.
The incomplete aspects of van Inwagen’s Quineanism be-
tray its implicit commitment to certain widespread views about
metaphysics which, I claim, turn out to be incompatible with
the success of its project. One such commitment is that ontol-
ogy aims to match a language-independent way in which reality
is carved up into objects. On this assumption, then, we are to
suppose that there are objective, determinate answers to onto-
logical questions and the methodology counselled is our best
route to finding out which of the candidate answers is true. To
take a wider view for a moment, this accords with the view that
‘Quine (or at least a Quinean)’ sees an answer to an ontologi-
cal question as ‘discovering an objective, mind-independent fact
about the world’ (Jenkins 2010, 884). The difficulty with such
a view is that depending on what we accept as a determining
factor for how the world really is, endorsing (Criterion), for in-
stance, may turn out to be the wrong approach. Even the other
theses could fail. For it is first of all possible that scepticism
trumps linguistic analysis: there is some way the world objec-
tively is that assessment of language cannot capture.14 We will
then be left with some degree of irresolvable indeterminacy, and
14This is what Terry Horgan and Matjaz̆ Potrc̆ (2008) believe actually obtains,
but to the extent that our analysis of language has limitations, they think that
the Quinean approach is insufficient. Their adoption of a different approach
serves in support of my point that Quineanism of van Inwagen’s brand is open
to sceptical worries.
our attempts at ontology will be prone to massive error because
features of human biology constrain how we individuate.15 I
contend that Quine would deny such a view because he would
not assign sense to the aim of matching how the world carves
itself up into objects: object individuation is something that we
do. Someone might think of a maxim they apply in ontology as
imposed by the world, but ‘he would be wrong: the maxim is
his own imposition, toward settling what is objectively indeter-
minate’ (Quine 1968, 191).
This way of seeing ontology comes partly, I think, from mis-
conceptions about how to understand the significance of the
inscrutability of reference for ontology.16 Taken as a negative
thesis it suggests that in virtue of the limitations of inquiry into
language-use, it is too difficult to give an appropriate translation
of a language: equated terms might still be replaceable by all
manner of bizarre candidates. On this conception we should
not trust particular statements but rather should look at over-
all features of the theory, choosing the best one we have and
taking that to be true (subject to modification if our theory was
not as good as we thought). Note that on this view, ordinary-
language ontology would be firmly rejected. The way we use
words would be wholly unreliable as a guide because focussing
on individual cases (which must be picked out by the language)
leads us directly to the indeterminacy arguments, so we engage
in analysis to determine as best we can what our beliefs entail
about ontology. The idea that ‘[w]hether we approve or not, the
15I have in mind the well-documented biases in human perceptual devel-
opment regarding object-permanence and individuation, examples of which
are discussed in Xu (1997).
16For reasons of space I will not go into detail on the relation between in-
scrutability of reference and indeterminacy of translation. I think that for
Quine the latter is also ontologically significant, but the inscrutability of ref-
erence is more well-supported (—Quine thinks it trivially follows from using
model theory to represent languages—) and is all that is required to make my
case.
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world has an ontology’ (Heil 2003, 1) survives on this under-
standing, but the world’s ontology is placed, epistemologically
speaking, at a substantial remove.
We should instead see the inscrutability of reference as a posi-
tive thesis. To clarify, I mean that we should say not that it is too
difficult to give a translation but that it is too easy. Quine notes
that the rival translation manuals of his thought experiment are
successful translation manuals:
There can be no doubt that rival systems of analytical hypotheses
can fit the totality of speech behavior to perfection . . . The point
is not that we cannot be sure whether the analytical hypothesis is
right, but that there is not even . . . an objective matter to be right
or wrong about. (Quine 1960, 72–73)
It is easy to forget this, but it is relevant because it means that
rather than mistrusting people’s ordinary use of language and
looking for the best shot at getting things right we should pro-
ceed in the manner of interpreters: by assuming that people
(including ourselves) are generally right and providing an ac-
count of the significance of their utterances. It could not be
determined that a community was radically wrong about its on-
tology but overwhelmingly successful in orienting themselves
in the world through language, or that they failed to operate in
the space of describing reality:17 it is incumbent on us to pro-
vide a reasonable account of what their utterances come to, and
it would be unreasonable to suppose them thoroughly discon-
nected from reality in either way. One cannot take oneself to be
trying to describe reality more earnestly than the typical human,
for whom getting this right is rather important!
17Quine does however think that someone might be best understood as not
operating in the conceptual space of ontology. Deviations like a language of
predicate functors can be accommodated, but nevertheless ‘the question of
ontological commitment is parochial, though within a much broader parish
than that of the speakers and writers of symbolic logic’ (Quine 1983, 500).
It is not clear what kind of language would be unwelcome among Quine’s
congregation.
4.2. Bolstering the Theses
The observations above put us in a position to offer the additions
to a Quinean metaontology that are most warranted by Quine’s
own work. There remains the challenge of responding to the
problems of §3 but it turns out, I claim, that these additions go
a long way toward demonstrating how to avoid implausibility
and irrelevance.
First we need an explanatory principle—that is, a principle
clarifying our explananda—and for Quine this means thinking
about science. We have already seen that van Inwagen discounts
Quine’s views on science because they are associated with his
epistemology, but again I see no reason to think that this suggests
their independence from metaontology. In fact, to make the
accusation of irrelevance less attractive, we must incorporate
Quine’s naturalism into our metaontology.
If we want to determine something interesting in ontology,
we need to be sure that it is dealing with something relevant to
how we all engage with the world. This is the essence of the
flaw of the Ontologese gambit for Quineanism covered in §3:
if we regress to Ontologese it is unclear why the toy language
developed is of any interest. It is when practising science that we
are responsive to evidence in the right way, and it is thus when
practising science that the import of our statements is greatest.
If we were not constrained by naturalism in our methodology,
we would lack strong reasons to render consonant disparate
areas of our discourse, but our understanding of all areas of
knowledge is interrelated, and it is this that makes ontology as
a practice clarificatory: we investigate the significance of certain
ordinary statements given the continuity of both vocabulary and
use between them and serious science.
At this point I anticipate accusations of ‘scientism’. Such crit-
icisms generally allege that in privileging science we end up
illegitimately casting out ordinary things with which we should
be satisfied. This accusation might be levelled at, e.g., Merricks
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 4 no. 6 [14]
(2003), whose eliminativist physical ontology is arrived at by
treating claims about the causal sufficiency of the microphysical
as trumping any concerns about the way we talk about ordinary
objects and their causal roles. It might also be accurate for some
of van Inwagen’s work18 but we can avoid the problem for our
strengthened Quineanism by casting the net of science widely.
For Quine it is science broadly construed that is important:
In science itself I certainly want to include the farthest flights of
physics and cosmology, as well as experimental psychology, his-
tory, and the social sciences. (Quine 1995, 251)
There are challenges in how we understand Quine’s natural-
ism—we certainly want to avoid casting the net so wide that the
thesis is not meaningful. However the use of ‘scientism’ as a
pejorative, denoting a perspective that treats every statement as
equivalent in all important ways to a statement of the behaviour
of a collection of electrons, does not correspond to Quine’s ap-
proach: when he explains why he privileges physics, he says
that
[t]he answer is not that everything worth saying can be translated
into the technical vocabulary of physics; not even that all good sci-
ence can be translated into that vocabulary. The answer is rather
this: nothing happens in the world, not the flutter of an eyelid, not
the flicker of a thought, without some redistribution of microphys-
ical states. (Quine 1981, 98)
If scientism is equivalent to either of the first two answers, then
Quine is not scientistic; if to the third, or something different,
then it is not obvious that Quine’s being scientistic would be a
bad thing.
We have thus seen no reason to exclude naturalism from
Quine’s metaontology. We can look to Quine for a passable
statement of this principle:
18See, for example, the framing of the special composition question in a
manner clearly giving special status to physically fundamental particles in
van Inwagen (1990, secs. 1–2).
(Naturalism) ‘[It] is within science itself, and not in some prior
philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described.’
(Quine 1981, 21)
Second we need a guiding principle, which for a Quinean
metaontology should take the form of a principle of charity. This
idea first appeared in analytic philosophy in Wilson (1959), from
whom Quine adopted it. The notion came to more prominence
in Donald Davidson’s work, but it is central to Quine’s thought
in a way that is easily missed. On the conception of language
underwritten by the principle of charity, it is a precondition
for linguistic understanding that we treat speakers as rational.
Furthermore we know roughly how statements relate to each
other, even in the absence of a full picture of those statements’
significance. We can see the role of the principle throughout
Quine’s writings, for instance where he states that ‘The maxim
of translation . . . is that assertions startlingly false on the face of
them are likely to turn on hidden differences of language’ (1960,
59). We might at a first approximation state this principle as
follows:
(Charity) Interpretations should maximise, as far as possible,
the truth and reasonableness of interpreted statements.
When we stress the requirement on interpretation that we un-
derstand persons as competent and combine it with the holis-
tic, theory-wide considerations about how a statement can be
understood that come with a nuanced understanding of (Crite-
rion), we arrive at an approach that is not crudely revisionary
but rather aims to explicate statements’ significance. Quine’s
vision of this process is much like that of one of his greatest
influences: of ‘making more exact a vague or not quite exact
concept used in everyday life or in an earlier stage of scientific
or logical development’ (Carnap 1947, 8).19
19The explicative status of the project also immediately precludes certain
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This undercuts the view of the language-ontology relation
that caused such trouble for van Inwagen’s Quineanism by dis-
allowing the divide between language-use and ontological com-
mitment and thereby precluding the accusation of implausibil-
ity. Rather than holding that there must be a fixed content
and seeking to explain that in light of separately reached meta-
physical conclusions, our endeavour in ontology (indeed more
generally in interpretation) is to provide an account of the sig-
nificance of our overall discourse on the necessary assumption
that it is by-and-large successful in describing how things are.
(Charity) could get us into trouble taken alone because it coun-
sels us to avoid treating statements as false and therefore sug-
gests that we never offer any revisionary account of a theory.
Combining it with (Naturalism), however, gets a fruitful bal-
ance. The plenitudinous excesses of (Charity), which are apt
to have us consider all sorts of loose talk as ontologically com-
mitting, are held in check by the requirement to reconcile our
earnestly-held beliefs with especial focus on those that most
reflect our scientific investigations.
A final requirement, whose full significance I cannot capture
here, is a limiting principle indicating the boundaries of what we
can expect from ontology. Quine claimed in various oft-ignored
passages that one cannot make sense of ontology except in a
relative sense: that is, there is no way to compare ontology
with ‘objective reality’ but only ways to evaluate an ontology
against rivals or against the theory it attempts to clarify. Only
by engaging in this process can we evaluate ontologies by cri-
teria like parsimony, simplicity, etc., and thereby decide which
to favour. Ontological relativity does not respond to anything
in the easy ontology argument, but is key to de-motivating the
use-based objections to, e.g., (Being). That our patterns of use for being-state-
ments and existence-statements are different does not mean that an explication
must continue to treat them differently, unless the difference in use turns out
to serve some purpose.
grounding challenge, which regards any linguistic approach as
allowing too much input from quirks of language to be meta-
physically relevant. The incorporation of (Charity) into strong
Quineanism blocks the move to Ontologese, dealing with one
source of perceived irrelevance, but this has not dealt with the
other. For instance Sider recommends that, on the assumption
that a principle of charity would cause problems for ‘deep’ meta-
physics in ordinary contexts, ‘one can partially and locally sus-
pend the considerations of charity that govern meaning’ (2014, 4)
to conduct debates without letting anything but metaphysically
heavyweight considerations matter. If ontological relativity is
right, this move is mistaken. For now, given the difficulty in
unpacking all of the implications of ontological relativity, this is
a mere promissory note, but there is no sign of ‘poor fit with re-
ality’ beyond failing to treat important sentences as true or com-
paring poorly to another ontology for theoretical virtues. This
precludes protests about failure to appreciate the fundamental
nature of reality because there is no way that an ontology fulfill-
ing the various requirements on theoretical adequacy could fail
to fit reality: ‘[s]pecifying the universe of a theory makes sense
only relative to some background theory, and only relative to
some choice of a manual of translation of the one theory into the
other’ (Quine 1968, 205).
As a preliminary attempt to state this thesis, then:
(Relativity) Describing the ontology of a theory makes sense
only relative to a translation into another theory.
Typically to avoid a regress through multiple translations, this
theory must be a background theory which we take as under-
stood, but this is not an absolute requirement and in certain
circumstances we may simply be interested in one theory’s in-
terpretation of the ontology of another theory. This principle
is of course controversial but it is required to avoid the internal
tensions that are picked up by the challenges of §3. Scepticism
about this principle, well-founded or not, would be a worry
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 4 no. 6 [16]
about the warrant for the overall approach, which is rather dif-
ferent from doubting the very coherency of the approach as was
possible for van Inwagen’s Quineanism.
4.3. Salvaging Van Inwagen’s Theses
We have found that van Inwagen’s account of Quineanism is too
weak to do justice to Quine’s metaontology, leaving it open to
attacks on its internal consistency. I have suggested, however,
that it is not wholly unsuitable, so there is still the question
whether, and if so how, van Inwagen’s theses can be incorporated
into a more wholeheartedly Quinean metaontology. We will
revisit the principles in the order in which we encountered them
in §2.
First, I agree with van Inwagen that Quine would accept (Non-
activity). It is implausible that we should think of being as
something ‘done’ by entities, especially on an approach involv-
ing the other theses. However we should be cautious about
certain arguments to this effect, van Inwagen’s among them. I
reject van Inwagen’s argument that endurance is the most gen-
eral activity for two reasons. First it is doubtful that everything
endures: one can coherently endorse abstract objects, for which
we might think endurance either does not apply or means some-
thing different than for concrete objects, and if it is possible for
something to exist for an instant then ‘endures’ cannot be true
of everything unless it just means ‘exists’. Second, I borrow an
argument from Quine, who objects to any characterisation of
conditions on what something has to do in order to be an object:
‘If Pegasus existed he would indeed be in space and time, but
only because the word “Pegasus” has spatiotemporal connota-
tions, and not because “exists” has spatiotemporal connotations’
(Quine 1948, 23). As the most inclusive of categories, what it is
to be an object is given by the kinds of object that there are. The
point resurfaces when Quine says:
There are philosophers who stoutly maintain that ‘exists’ said of
numbers, classes and the like and ‘exists’ said of material objects
are two usages of an ambiguous term ‘exists’. What mainly baffles
me is the stoutness of their maintenance. What can they possibly
count as evidence? Why not view [‘exists’] as unambiguous but
very general[?] (1960, 131)
This demonstrates an alternative defence of (Non-activity): un-
less ‘activity’ means something rather insubstantial it is an im-
plausible restriction to place on what could count as an ob-
ject. It is primarily by analysing statements held true that we
can reach decisions about ontology, and this does not require
us to abandon in advance a neutral stance regarding what ac-
tivities are going on (e.g., we can cautiously accept that there
is ‘sport-playing-like’ activity occurring without committing to
individuative claims). Nonetheless, while (Non-activity) is de-
fensible, I think that it ought to be accorded a marginal place in
the Quinean metaontology: it is a conception of being that in-
forms the aims of ontology, but it functions as a presupposition
in Quineanism, accepted by virtue of engaging in an analytical
project at all. We might even plausibly consider it to be entailed
by the adequacy of the existential quantifier, which has no con-
notations of activity, to capture existence. (It would therefore be
a simple corollary of (Formality) and (Being).)
We can be brief on the second thesis. I think it clear that
our justification for endorsing (Being) still stands, and that van
Inwagen’s arguments in its support are compelling. This is
fortunate: abandoning that thesis would make ‘Quineanism’ an
inappropriate label, given Quine’s ardent advocacy especially
in, e.g., his (1948).
Onto the third: our observations about (Univocity) suggest
that a more helpful way of understanding the key claim is with
a modified version of the thesis to reflect the weaker content it
should be assigned:
(Univocity*) ‘Exists’ can be assigned a single, universal mean-
ing.
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Note that the above quote accords with this interpretation:
Quine expresses bewilderment about the notion that someone
would deny the possibility (or appropriateness) of assigning a
unified meaning to ‘exists’. This correctly puts Quineanism in
opposition to, e.g., Putnam, while allowing what I have called
‘weak quantifier variance’.
I can imagine no reasons to reject the fourth thesis—
(Formality)—that would not be mere consequences of rejecting
(Being) or (Univocity*). However this close association between
those three theses brings up an important modification: (Be-
ing), (Univocity*) and (Formality) should, I think, be considered
sub-theses of a more general claim. As was clear throughout
the discussion in §2, the three claims are highly inter-dependent
and they can be seen as components of a general thesis about
the aim of ontology: it ought to tell us how a language has to be
structured quantificationally if it is to capture those statements
whose truth we are required to preserve. (Being) and (Univoc-
ity*) now look like the ordinary-language and formal-language
sides respectively of the same coin. Suppose that either failed. If
statements of the form ‘There are Fs’ generally had content worth
capturing over and above that of ‘Fs exist’, one could define two
corresponding quantifiers, so that depending on conditions one
could utter a quantified statement in a sense matching up only
to existence-statements, or also to being-statements. Similarly if
‘exists’ could be assigned multiple complementary senses one
could simply introduce terminology to generate something like
a being/existence divide unless those several senses were very
different from those typically proposed.
Notably in the above passage Quine clearly considers the is-
sues intimately related, as evinced by his examples (1960, 131n2)
of the view he finds bizarre: Ryle and Russell. The former denies
(Univocity) and the latter (Being), but Quine considers them two
of a kind. Thus I envisage a broader principle, which should
be understood as at least combining (Being), (Univocity*) and
(Formality):
(Formalism) Ontological questions are quantificational ques-
tions.20
We now move on to the final thesis. Some of van Inwagen’s
comments on (Criterion) are quite right: there are no determi-
nate commitments hidden within a statement itself, and (Crite-
rion) does indeed give clear grounds for holding a view guilty of
ontological commitments. We must acknowledge the element
of choice in interpretation, which is informed by considerations
about how to make the overall theory most plausible. However
it is not simply a matter of how far to translate into ‘quantifier-
variable idiom’: we may be drawn to an account of certain state-
ments as of totally misleading form, and thereby diverge from
the limited flexibility of van Inwagen’s proposal. Here the prag-
matic aspects of our decisions are more far-reaching than he
acknowledges because we might find ourselves interpreting ut-
terances in ways that radically alter their surface form in order to
account for how people make successful judgements about the
world, especially in light of (Charity). Considering again ‘Every
planet is at any time at some distance from every star’, we must
decide, van Inwagen says, whether to consider it as quantifying
over some or all of planets, stars, times and distances (though
it would seem absurd to take quantification over stars seriously
without doing the same for planet-talk), but this sells short the
options available.
An important example is metaphorical talk:21 it is open to us to
interpret a statement as metaphor, allowing us to reconstrue its
ontological commitments more drastically. For instance, ‘There
is a monkey on her back’ ought not to be construed as being
20I have taken this statement from Fine (2009)’s account of Quine’s meta-
ontology, which he sets up in order to undermine. It is often an irritating
side-effect of dissecting an opponent’s view that one shows them how to
express it more elegantly.
21This presupposes a satisfactory reply to the challenge from Yablo that I
put aside above (note 6).
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 4 no. 6 [18]
ontologically committing to monkeys: even, one might think,
taking the commitment in a metaphorical sense would be a
misinterpretation. This is a toy example, but in more significant
areas substantial revision could be key: if Ladyman and Ross
turn out to be right to suggest that the right understanding of
physics ‘has nothing to do with putative tiny objects or their
collisions’ (2007, 44), we might counsel a radical reconstrual
of parts of scientific discourse rather than requiring either the
abandonment of the term ‘particle’ or its use as a primitive term.
Another point that is important yet understated by van In-
wagen is the holism inherent to the process. Obviously van
Inwagen would accept that there is something schematic about
applications of the Quinean criterion (it is supposed to be ap-
plied to kinds rather than piecemeal), but this should be a greater
focus. Considerations about whether a term can be considered
non-committing in all contexts are essential to whether it can
be considered non-committing in any one context. Suppose, for
instance, that there is no way to make sense of mathematical
statements like the axiom of infinity without accepting genuine
reference to numbers, yet that we cannot abandon said axiom.
It is hardly comforting to then claim that ‘2 is prime’ can be con-
strued in a manner that avoids reference to numbers because
we will not preserve the purported benefits of interpreting the
claim in this way (assuming no compelling arguments for a
double-standard like finitism). We start from the assumption
that most of the population’s statements are true or reasonable
(again showing that (Charity) is important) and analyse those
statements with a view to showing how they are best understood
as part of a more general theory.
A final point to add regarding (Criterion), somewhat deriva-
tive of the above, is to what it is applied. Van Inwagen is correct to
indicate that identifying a theory is not straightforward, but he
misleadingly suggests that it can be fruitfully applied to people
or arbitrary sets of sentences: for him this method is ‘the most
profitable strategy to follow in order to get people to make their
ontological commitments—or the ontological commitments of
their discourse—clear’ (van Inwagen 1998, 246). However, a set
of statements may be isolated from the grounds for holding its
members to quantify over a kind: for Quine statements cannot
be interpreted in isolation from the language or the theory in
which they are located. Even if we can attach some meaning to
a set of statements independent of the wider theory, it will be
insufficient to generate an informative ontological commitment.
On a related note, it cannot be right that when I utter a sentence
I thereby commit myself to the entities it quantifies over on the
best interpretation given within my theory. First it supposes
some particular set of sentences that I accept, identifiable as my
theory. This is implausible and would run the risk of solipsism
since accepted statements will almost always differ from speaker
to speaker. We need instead some (vague) degree of agreement
to consider sentences of a certain kind as falling within a shared
theory. This is required because otherwise the claim that we
should privilege the ontological commitments of the best the-
ory is odd: we would end up with substantial scope for people
to have aberrant ontologies by virtue of not fully understanding
the best theory, despite their ways of speaking being dependent
on this shared theory.
We have seen that several aspects of (Criterion)’s application
are not fully appreciated on van Inwagen’s account. Should we
develop the thesis to accommodate this? I think not; instead
we should treat (Criterion) as a fairly minimal principle, sup-
plemented by the other theses. Van Inwagen is keen to see the
principle as very broad, encompassing a whole range of atti-
tudes to ontology, but this skews the content of his Quinean
metaontology heavily toward (Criterion) and makes it hard to
evaluate where problems reside. I mentioned in §2.5 that it was
puzzling why van Inwagen had not focussed on the two succinct
statements of (Criterion) in his work, and here we find an expla-
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nation. Those statements reflect a sparser version of (Criterion)
that simply tells us from where we get our ontological commit-
ments once we have regimented our theory, while van Inwagen
wants to make (Criterion) do far more work. It is also worth not-
ing that the second of the two statements of (Criterion) is hard
to square with van Inwagen’s use of the thesis. It states that a
theory is committed precisely to those things to which its bound
variables ‘must be capable of referring’, and this ‘must’ relies on
a sense of plasticity in interpretation that sits badly with van In-
wagen’s separation of metaphysics from ordinary concerns. On
my account the Quinean’s interest is not in creating a language
with a particular domain that cuts out certain metaphysically
undesirable kinds, but in giving an account of what the theory
constantly operating in the background requires if it is to be
right. I therefore propose we embrace a sparse statement of the
principle:
(Criterion) To be is to be the value of a variable.
This provides only a sloganised understanding of (Criterion),
but as has been the case throughout this project, slogans can be
useful despite their tendency to oversimplify the issues.
Conclusion
I have argued that Quineanism as presented by van Inwagen is
fatally flawed: its five theses mesh poorly with Quine’s work on
some counts, and more worryingly it leaves its proponents with
no response to the accusations of implausibility and irrelevance
that have been mustered by dissidents of various stripes. Incor-
porating considerations of charity, naturalism and ontological
relativity into a tidied-up set of theses resolves these internal
problems to leave us with a new set of five theses, most of which
are stronger; aside from achieving a better balance between the
theses’ importance, this set is more defensible than van Inwa-
gen’s Quineanism.
(Formalism) Ontological questions are quantificational ques-
tions.
(Naturalism) It is within science itself, and not in some prior
philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described.
(Charity) Interpretations should maximise, as far as possible,
the truth and reasonableness of interpreted statements.
(Criterion) To be is to be the value of a variable.
(Relativity) Describing the ontology of a theory makes sense
only relative to a translation into another theory.
More precise exposition of the theses, sustained argument for
favouring this position over other metaontologies, and investi-
gation of the wider Quinean tradition, are three important tasks
to be tackled elsewhere. For now I must rest content with hav-
ing hopefully shown that Quinean metaontology need not be
implausible or irrelevant, provided we are willing to commit to
more of Quine’s controversial, but insightful, principles.
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